some analysts have argued that growing inequality can be offset by a rise in mobility, tacitly assuming that these two distributional phenomena can move in opposite directions (Friedman 1962) .
At the theoretical level, approaches linking mobility and inequality tend to focus on microlevel mechanisms-the motivations and resources affecting individual decision making-connecting these macrostructural phenomena. Two perspectives can be distinguished. A "resource perspective" indicates that high inequality will result in decreased mobility because the uneven distribution of resources will benefit those most advantaged in the competition for success. In contrast, an "incentive perspective" argues that inequality will raise the stakes in the competition, thereby inducing higher mobility.
In the end, the question about the link between intergenerational mobility and socioeconomic inequality is empirical, and currently, the empirical evidence is thin and inconclusive. Part of the problem is that mobility has been studied in a small pool of mostly industrialized countries, all of which share relatively similar levels of inequality. To explore the link between mobility and inequality at the empirical and theoretical levels, this article introduces Chile to the comparative mobility project.
Chile is a middle-income country that has undergone significant political and economic change in the past few decades. In the mid-20th century, the Chilean development strategy was defined by import-substitutive industrialization. The economy of Chile was closed to international markets, and the state had a pivotal economic and productive role. Mounting social problems associated with unequal development and urban migration led to two progressive administrations in the 1960s and early 1970s. These administrations conducted major redistributive reforms, including the nationalization of enterprises, an educational reform, and an agrarian reform. This progressive path was violently halted by a military coup in 1973. Led by General Pinochet, the military took power and retained it until 1990.
Once in power, the authoritarian regime conducted a deep and fast market-oriented transformation, consisting of the now standard package of macroeconomic stabilization, privatization of enterprises and social services, and liberalization of prices and markets. As a result, Chile transformed from a closed economy with heavy state intervention into one of the most, if not the most, open and market-based economy of the world.
After a deep recession in the early 1980s, Chile has experienced substantial and sustained economic growth since the late 1980s, which concurs with the reestablishment of democratic rule. The period of redemocratization and growth during the 1990s has led to significantly improved living standards for the Chilean population. The dark side of this success story is the persistent economic inequality in the country. Inequality, historically very high, grew during the military government, and Chile currently ranks as the 10th most unequal country in the world. The Chilean pattern of inequality can be characterized by "concentration at the top": Chile is highly unequal because the wealthiest segment of the society receives a very large portion of the national income, whereas the differences between the poor and middle-income sectors are much less pronounced, lower even than in some industrialized nations. Although inequality is by definition associated with concentration, the Chilean case is extreme, as compared with the industrialized world and even with other Latin American nations.
These features render Chile an adjudicative case. If mobility and inequality are related, Chile should show mobility rates significantly different from those of its industrialized peers. To explore these issues, my analysis includes three components.
First, I analyze the Chilean mobility regime in a comparative perspective. Mobility is herein defined as the association between class of origin (father's class position) and class of destination (current class position) net of the changes in the class structure over time (structural mobility). Also known as "relative mobility" or "social fluidity," mobility represents the level of openness or degree of equality of opportunity in a society. I place Chile in the comparative context by fitting the "core model of social fluidity" to the Chilean intergenerational mobility table. This model claims to represent the basic similarity in mobility across countries, but it has been tested in only a few, mostly industrialized, countries (see, for example, Goldthorpe 1992a, 1992b) . By fit-ting the core model to the Chilean table, I determine to what extent Chile departs, if it does, from the assumed international homogeneity in mobility regimes and what the sources of its possible departure are. Even if the core model has become a milestone in comparative analysis, it has a number of undesirable properties, discussed later in the Methods section. Thus, as a modeling alternative, I use a hybrid model that combines association parameters assuming a hierarchical conception of the mobility structure, with patterns accounting for class immobility. Interpretation of these two models provides a detailed description of the Chilean mobility regime, and an evaluation of the main factorshierarchical differences across classes, class inheritance, barriers across sectors of the economy-driving Chilean mobility dynamics. Second, I compare the level of mobility in Chile with that of other countries using primary data from France, England, Scotland, Ireland, Sweden, the United States, and Israel. All these countries have a much more egalitarian income distribution than Chile. Thus, if mobility is associated with inequality, the international comparison should show that mobility opportunities in Chile are significantly different from the opportunities in these industrialized nations.
Third, my analysis moves from an international to a temporal comparison. To explore the association between mobility and inequality further, I study Chilean mobility rates over time. Using a cohort analysis, I examine whether the significant increase in inequality associated with the market transformation of the 1970s and 1980s had any noticeable effect on Chilean mobility rates.
Advancing some of the major results, the findings present an interesting paradox. On the one hand, the Chilean mobility regime is found to be driven almost exclusively by the hierarchical distance between classes, which is determined in turn by the level of inequality in the country. This finding is consistent with the negative relationship between mobility and inequality posed by the "resource perspective." On the other hand, the international comparison indicates that Chile is impressively fluid despite its high economic inequality, and the temporal analysis shows no change in Chilean mobility over time despite the growing inequality during the military regime. Therefore, the international and temporal comparisons seem to contradict the negative relationship between mobility and inequality, and to suggest that high inequality may in fact induce mobility.
Solving this apparent paradox, I argue, requires switching the analytical focus from the level to the pattern of both mobility and inequality. When the pattern of these two distributive phenomena is considered, the contradiction disappears, and the mechanisms driving the mobility-inequality association can be examined.
The argument is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical and theoretical evidence concerning the association of mobility with inequality. Section 3 describes the Chilean context. It discusses the most salient characteristics of the Chilean socioeconomic structure and presents a brief historical description of the major changes in the national political economy over the past few decades. Section 4 introduces the data and analytical approach. Section 5 presents the comparative analysis of mobility in Chile, including the description of the Chilean mobility regime, the international comparison of the fluidity level in Chile, and the analysis of change over time. Section 6 presents a summary of the findings, the conclusions, and the implications of the Chilean case for the comparative study of inequality. OC CI IA AT TI IO ON N B BE ET TW WE EE EN N I IN NE EQ QU UA AL LI IT TY Y  A AN ND D M MO OB BI IL LI IT TY Y: : E  EM MP PI IR RI IC CA AL L A  AN ND D  T TH HE EO OR RE ET TI IC CA AL L E EV VI ID DE EN NC CE E Although mobility and inequality "go together intuitively" (Hout 2004:969) , they are different dimensions of the social distribution of advantage. The former refers to the cross-sectional dimension, which determines the individual position in a social hierarchy. The latter refers to its intergenerational dimension, specifically to differential access to these positions as determined by the position of origin (Marshall and Swift 1999:243; Marshall et al 1997:13) .
A AS SS SO
At the conceptual level, the differences between these two distributional phenomena are clear. Inequality describes the distribution of resources at any particular point in time. Mobility describes inequality of opportunity, the chances that someone with a particular social origin will attain a more rather than a less advantaged destination regardless of the socioeconomic distance between these destinations. This is why "individuals are anonymous for inequality but not for mobility" (Behrman 1999:72) . In fact, mobility analysis assumes path dependence in the reproduction of the social structure across generations, and studies the extent and morphology of such intergenerational dependence.
The conceptual difference may have important practical implications. As argued by Friedman (1962) , and echoed more recently by some researchers and policymakers, a given extent of income inequality under conditions of great mobility and change may be less a cause for concern than the same degree of inequality in a rigid system wherein the position of "particular families in the income distribution does not vary widely over time" (p. 171).
The key question is whether these two distributional phenomena are independent. Two theoretical approaches address this question. Both focus on the micro-level mechanisms that purportedly link these macrophenomena: the individual decision-making processes. The "incentive approach" claims that the motivation to pursue mobility is proportional to the amount of cross-sectional inequality. If inequality approaches zero, so does the payoff for mobility. Conversely, great inequality increases both the inducement to pursue mobility for those who are initially disadvantaged and the incentive to resist mobility for those who are initially advantaged. In other words, inequality raises the stakes of mobility (Hout 2004:970; see also Tahlin 2004) .
The "resource approach" contends that mobility depends critically on resources rather than on incentives. The higher the inequality, the greater the distance in terms of human, financial, cultural, and social resources across different social origins. In a highly unequal society, the stakes of mobility will be high across the board, but the crucial resources controlled by individuals will be so unevenly distributed that competition certainly will benefit those more advantaged (see Goldthorpe 2000 :254, Stephens 1979 :54, and Tawney 1965 for a seminal elaboration of this argument). The outcome of high cross-sectional inequality will be the rigid reproduction of the class structure over time, i.e., low social fluidity.
Because resources and incentives work in different directions, the effect of inequality on mobility can be thought of as an additive calculation. If the impact of resources outweighs that of incentives, we should expect a negative association between inequality and mobility. Conversely, the association should be positive if incentives are more relevant than resources in the competition for advantaged positions. In what follows, I argue that consideration of resources and incentives affecting mobility at the micro-level should be preceded by a macrolevel understanding of both mobility and inequality. This understanding should consider the pattern of these two distributional phenomena, not only their overall level, and should focus on the location and depth of the major cleavages in the social structure.
T TH HE E E EM MP PI IR RI IC CA AL L E EV VI ID DE EN NC CE E
Empirical evidence concerning the mobility-inequality association is scarce. Although high-quality data on inequality exist for a large number of countries (e.g., Deininger and Squire 1996) , comparable data on mobility are available only for a few, mostly industrialized nations. The most important source of comparable mobility data is the Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrialized Countries (CASMIN) project, which includes 15 industrialized nations. 1 The findings of the CASMIN project are highly relevant for the association between mobility and inequality. The CASMIN project concluded that whereas absolute mobility varies across countries and over time because of differences in national occupational structures, relative mobility-the association between class of origin and destination net of differences in marginal occupational distributions-is extremely homogeneous across countries and over time. These findings were expressed in the "common" and "constant" social fluidity hypotheses, respectively. The basic temporal and international similarity was systematized into a "core model" of social fluidity (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1987a , 1987b , 1992a see Featherman, Jones, and Hauser 1975 and Hauser et al. 1975a , 1975b , for the original hypotheses). Common social fluidity is claimed to hold (at least) in industrial societies with a "market economy and nuclear family" (Featherman et al. 1975:340) , and it would be explained by "the substantial uniformity in the economic resources and desirability of occupations" (Grusky and Hauser 1984) .
The significant international similarity in mobility patterns has been confirmed largely in pairwise or three-country comparisons in a few industrialized countries: Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero (1979) , Erikson et al. (1982) , and Hauser (1984a Hauser ( , 1984b for England, France, and Sweden; McRoberts and Selbec (1981) for the United States and Canada; and Kerckhoff et al. (1985) for England and the United States. As more industrialized countries were added to the comparative template, it was shown that Sweden and the Netherlands are more fluid (Erikson et al. 1982; Ganzeboom and De Graaf 1984) , and that Germany, Japan, and Ireland are more rigid (Hout and Jackson 1986; Ishida 1993; Müller 1986 ). However, the most striking finding was the significant similarity across countries despite the different historical backgrounds and institutional arrangements.
On the basis of the CASMIN project, a relative consensus has emerged favoring the hypothesis of substantial international similarity in mobility patterns. Similarity does not mean complete homogeneity, however. There certainly exist some national deviations, but, it is argued, they can be explained by highly specific, historically based institutional factors rather than by systematic relationship to other variable characteristics of national societies. There seems to be only one exception to this "unsystematic fluctuation." Comparison of the CASMIN countries found that a small but significant portion of the international variation in mobility is related to economic inequality, with higher inequality leading to less fluidity (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992a, chapter 12 ; also see Tyree, Semyonov, and Hodge 1979 for an earlier analysis).
This finding supports the resource approach linking the two distributive phenomena. Additional evidence consistent with the resources approach was presented by Jonsson and Mills (1993) , who compared Sweden and England and found higher fluidity in the more equal Swedish society; by Bjorklund and Jantti (1997) , who compared earnings mobility in the United States and Sweden and found mobility to be higher in Sweden; and by analyses of intergenerational earnings mobility in several Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, which suggest higher mobility in more equal nations (Solon 2002) . 2 However, a more recent comparative analysis of mobility trends between 1970 and 1990 in 11 industrialized countries does not find evidence of a relationship between inequality and fluidity (Breen and Luijkx 2004a:396) . This supports an earlier indication of no association between the two distributional phenomena (Grusky and Hauser 1984) .
In sum, evidence about a potential mobility-inequality association based on cross-country comparisons is inconclusive, not only because of divergent f indings, but also because of the small number of countries included and the potentially high collinearity between inequality and other explanatory factors.
Empirical analysis of mobility trends within countries has not provided a conclusive answer either. The CASMIN finding of "constant social fluidity" over time has been recently tested in the aforementioned comparative analysis of mobility in 11 countries. This analysis, including 10 European nations and Israel (Breen 2004) , finds growing fluidity in some countries, but null or slight temporal change in others. While Britain, Israel and less conclusively Germany display "constant fluidity"; some indication of growing openness is detected in France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Sweden. However, in France, Hungary, Poland and Sweden all change occurred between the 1970s and 1980s, and stability has prevailed since then (Breen and Luijkx 2004b:54) . Changes in Ireland and Italy are quite minor (Layte and Whelan 2004; Pisati and Schizzerotto 2004) , and only the Netherlands displays a sustained increase in mobility over the entire period considered (Ganzeboom and Luijkx 2004) . Mobility has also been found to increase over time in the United States between the early 1970s and the mid 1980s (Hout 1988) . However these increases in fluidity are not univocally preceded by a reduction of inequality, thus casting doubts on a potential association between inequality and mobility.
A careful analysis of mobility trends in Russia shows a significant decline in mobility associated with an increase in inequality after the market transformation of the early 1990s (Gerber and Hout 2004) , which provides additional support for the resource approach. The advantage of the Russian study is that "the market transition in Russia .|.|. altered so many fundamental economic institutions so rapidly that we can confidently ascribe changes in social mobility .|.|. to this source rather than to cultural change or industrialization" (Gerber and Hout 2004:678) . It is not clear, however, whether it is growth in inequality, recession, some other change associated with the radical liberalization of the economy, or a combination of these factors that triggered a decline in fluidity in contemporary Russia.
In this context, Chile presents an ideal case for an examination of the association between inequality and mobility. Given the extreme economic inequality in the country, if the unequal distribution of resources or incentives has an impact on mobility opportunities, the Chilean level of fluidity should be significantly different from that of industrialized nations. Additionally, given the increase in inequality associated with the market reform of the 1970s and 1980s, analysis of mobility before and after the reform would provide supplementary evidence concerning the potential mobility-inequality relationship. Naturally, a single case study will not supply a definitive answer to these questions. However, by combining an examination of the Chilean mobility regime in the context of historical transformations in the country with an international comparative analysis, and with an assessment of mobility trends over time, this article provides important insights into the existence of a link between mobility and inequality and the mechanisms driving it.
T TH HE E C CH HI IL LE EA AN N C CO ON NT TE EX XT T I IN N C CO OM MP PA AR RA AT TI IV VE E P PE ER RS SP PE EC CT TI IV VE E During the second half of the 20th century, Chile transformed from an agrarian, semifeudal society into an urban, service-based one. Between 1950 and 2000, the rural population declined from almost 40 to 17 percent (Braun et al. 2000; INE 2002 ). This defines Chile as a mostly urban country, with an 83 percent rate of urbanization, larger than the 78 percent rate in the United States. In tandem with urbanization, Chile experienced a reallocation of employment from the agricultural to the tertiary sector of the economy. The share of agriculture in total employment declined from 38 percent in 1950 to 17 percent in 2000. Whereas the share of manufacturing remained constant at about 18 percent, the share of the service sector rose from 42 to 65 percent (Braun et al. 2000; INE 2002) .
Urbanization and tertiarization are processes that virtually all countries experienced during the 20th century. Within this secular trend, the Chilean political economy is marked by specific institutional developments that shape its stratification structure. From the 1940s to the 1970s, the Chilean economic landscape, as that of its Latin American neighbors, was defined by import-substitutive industrialization (ISI). Emerging as a reaction to the collapse of international trade caused by the Great Depression (Ellworth 1945 ) and based on the "deterioration of the terms of trade" theory (Prebisch 1950) , ISI was based on two types of policies. The first was oriented to closing the Chilean economy to international markets, and the second was oriented to promoting national industrialization. The Chilean state became the leading productive agent, supporting industry through credit, investments, and technical assistance, and taking a direct productive role through the creation of public enterprises (Stallings 1978) . After a sanguine beginning, with industrial production growing at almost 7 percent per year between 1940 and 1950 (Mamalakis 1976; Munoz 1968) , ISI started to fail, economic growth stagnated, and social turmoil resulting from massive urban migration and vast social inequalities increased.
In 1964, a progressive administration took power and adopted as its mandate the correction of extreme inequality in the country by a "Revolution in Freedom" (Gazmuri 2000) . This progressive government launched redistributive policies, including an agrarian reform and an educational reform. The redistributive agenda, boosted by a socialist administration that came to power in 1970, was abruptly halted by a military coup in 1973. The military took power and retained it until 1990. During these 17 years, the military regime conducted a deep market-oriented transformation. Now turned into the "Washington consensus" paradigm (Williamson 1990) , this reform included macroeconomic stabilization, deregulation of prices and markets, and the privatization of enterprises and social services. It transformed Chile from a closed economy with heavy state intervention into one of the most open, market-based economies in the world, with the productive and welfare role of the state reduced to a minimum (Edwards and Cox-Edwards 1991; Martinez and Diaz 1999; Meller 1996; Velasco 1994) .
The depth of the market reform coupled with a world recession led in the late 1970s and early 1980s to the deepest economic crisis since the Great Depression. A third of the labor force was unemployed, and poverty afflicted nearly half of Chilean households (Meller 1991) . The post-crisis recovery, starting in the late 1980s, was substantial and sustained, and coincided with the redemocratization of the country. The gross domestic product (GDP) per capita grew more than 6 percent annually for 15 years, a novel rate for Chile, only comparable in recent times to the "East Asian Miracle" (World Bank 1993). The sharp economic growth has transformed Chile from one of the poorest countries in Latin America (Hofman 2000 
T TH HE E C CH HI IL LE EA AN N L LE EV VE EL L A AN ND D P PA AT TT TE ER RN N O OF F I IN NE EQ QU UA AL LI IT TY Y
The dark side of this "success story" is economic inequality. Structurally rooted in a feudal agrarian structure, the institutional legacy of the colonial period, and in the slow expansion of education (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; World Bank 2003b) , inequality has remained persistently high during the 20th century. The Gini coefficient reached .58 in the 1990s, which compares with a much lower Gini of .34 among the industrialized countries, and is large even in the highly unequal Latin American context, with its average Gini of .49 (Deininger and Squire 1996; Marcel and Solimano 1994) . As Figure 1 indicates, Chilean inequality is almost twice that in most industrialized countries, and 1.5 times that in the United States, the most unequal nation of the industrialized world.
Not only the level, but also the pattern of inequality in Chile significantly departs from that of the industrialized world. With the wealthiest Chilean decile receiving 42.3 percent of the total national income (MIDEPLAN 2001) , the Chilean pattern of inequality is characterized by high "concentration at the top." Although inequality is by definition related to concentration, the Chilean case is extreme, as compared with the industrialized world, and even with other Latin American countries. A comparison between the income of each decile and the income of the preceding (poorer) decile illustrates the point. The ratio between the wealthiest and the second wealthiest decile is twice as large in Chile as in the United States and England, and one of the largest in Latin America, depicting high elite concentration. In contrast, the ratio between the second poorest and the poorest deciles in Chile is half that of the United States and England, indicating that inequality at the bottom of the income distribution is much lower in Chile than in these industrialized nations (Szekely and Hilgert 1999) .
In fact, as Figure 2 indicates, Chile is the fourth most unequal country in the most unequal region of the world. However, if the wealthiest decile is excluded, Chilean inequality is dramatically reduced, and Chile becomes the most equal Latin American country, even more equal than the United States (InterAmerican Development Bank 1999). Therefore, Chile is unequal largely because the elite concentrates an extremely high proportion of the national income. Across the nonelite classes, the distribution of resources is much more uniform.
Inequality is not a new development in Chilean society, but rather has deep historical roots. Figure 3 presents the longest available series on inequality in Chile, depicting earnings distribution since 1957 in Santiago 3 and showing persistently high inequality over the last half century. However, there is significant variation over time: a short decline of inequality during the progressive administrations of the mid-1960s and early 1970s, an increase since the military regime took power in 1973, a peak in 1984, and a small decline after the democratic transition to levels still higher than those that preceded the military regime.
L LA AT TE E I IN ND DU US ST TR RI IA AL LI IZ ZA AT TI IO ON N, , M MA AR RK KE ET T R RE EF FO OR RM M, , A AN ND D T TH HE E C CH HI IL LE EA AN N C CL LA AS SS S S ST TR RU UC CT TU UR RE E
The "common social fluidity" hypothesis asserts that all international variation in mobility patterns is attributable to highly specific, historically formed national characteristics. In the Chilean case, these factors may be related to the market reform of the 1970s and 1980s and the rapid economic growth since the late 1980s. National mobility studies suggest that countries experiencing rapid industrialization may be characterized by weaker sector barriers to mobility, specifically barriers between the selfemployed and employees and between agricultural and nonagricultural classes (Goldthorpe, Yaish, and Kraus 1997 and Yaish 2004 In addition, two components of the Chilean market transformation may have contributed to the weakness of mobility barriers across sectors of the economy. The first component is the agrarian reform and subsequent counterreform undertaken by the military regime. The second one is the opening of the economy to international trade and the retrenchment of the state, which led to a decline in formal employment 3 Santiago, the Chilean capital, comprises about one-third of the country's population. Assessment by Chilean experts suggests that Santiago trends present an unbiased picture of trends at the national level. Although earnings inequality is not as comprehensive a measure as total income inequality, it is an adequate, much more accurately measured, proxy (Galbraith 2002 and to the growth and segmentation of the selfemployed sector.
The main objective of the Chilean agrarian reform (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) was to reduce the extreme land concentration in the country. The reform was very successful. In 1955, the top 7 percent of landowners held 65 percent of the land, and the bottom 37 percent held only 1 percent. By 1973, the last year of the reform, 43 percent of the land had been expropriated (Kay 2002; Scott 1996 ). An agrarian counterreform was launched by the military regime as a way of returning the land to its former owners. It did not, however, restore the traditional hacienda order (Gomez and Echenique 1988; Rivera 1988) . In fact, the military government returned only one-third of the plots to their old owners, sold another third, and adjudicated the remaining third to the small proprietors benefited by the agrarian reform. Unable to compete with the now cheap food imports, many small proprietors opted to sell their plots. As a consequence, as much as twothirds of the Chilean agricultural land came up for sale, creating an active land market. The main beneficiaries of the "marketization of the countryside" were a new group of export-oriented entrepreneurs and international investors, who bought large tracts of land (Gwynne 1996; Kay 2002 ). Thus, the reform and counterreform triggered a massive "change of hands" in the Chilean countryside, likely altering the patterns of land inheritance.
The second major effect of the market reform on the class structure was the reduction of formal employment, caused by the decline of the industrial working class and by the shrinkage of the state. Incapable of competing with the now cheap imports, the working class plummeted from 34 percent of total employment in the early 1970s to 20 percent in 1980, while public employment dropped from 14 to 8.4 percent in the same period (Leon and Martinez 2000; Schkolnick 2000; Velasquez 1990 ). The decline in industrial and public employment led to an increase in self-employment from about 15 percent in 1970 to about 28 percent in 1980 (Thomas 1996) , followed by a decline through the economic recovery before stabilization at about 22 percent of the total employment in 2000 (MIDEPLAN 2001) . In contrast to industrialized countries, in which the selfemployment rate usually is within the one-digit range and involves capital ownership, in Chile, it encompasses more than one-fifth of the labor force. Furthermore, self-employment had become a survival strategy for a large number of former industrial and public employees, appropriately labeled "forced entrepreneurialism" (Infante and Klein 1995; Portes, Castells, and Benton 1989) . As a consequence, the Chilean self-employed sector is voluminous and segmented. It includes a small segment of entrepreneurs oriented to capital accumulation and able to hire employees, and a large segment of self-employed workers mostly engaged in "survival activities" and unable to hire the labor of others. Differences in economic wellbeing between these two groups are massive, with the former group earning, on average, three times more than the latter (MIDEPLAN 2001) .
To be sure, a large self-employed sector is not a result of the market transformation. Selfemployment has been historically high in Latin America because, according to some scholars, the region has experienced "dependent integration" into the world capitalistic system (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1982; Luxembourg 1951) . However, the internal heterogeneity of the self-employed sector increased during the market reform, in a pattern that foretold what happened in the rest of Latin America during the 1990s (Klein and Tokman 2000; Portes and Hoffman 2003) , and what may be current developments in the industrialized world (Arum and Müller 2004; Noorderhaven et al. 2003) . These characteristics of the Chilean class structure are considered in the comparative analysis of Chilean mobility.
D DA AT TA A A AN ND D A AN NA AL LY YT TI IC CA AL L A AP PP PR RO OA AC CH H
This study uses the 2001 Chilean Mobility Survey (CMS). The CMS is a nationally representative, multistage, stratified sample of male heads of household ages 24 to 69. The sampling strategy includes the following stages. First, 87 primary sampling units (PSUs) (counties) are selected. Then blocks within the PSUs are selected, and finally, households within blocks are chosen. Counties are stratified according to size (fewer than 20,000; 20,000 to 100,000; 100,000 to 200,000; and more than 200,000 inhabitants) and by geographic zone (North, Center, South). All PSUs in the large size stratum are included in the sample to increase effi- (MIDEPLAN 2001) . Among those excluded, 86.5 percent are the sons of the head of the household, 12.4 percent are another relative of the head, and 1.1 percent are other nonrelated males. Their occupational distribution, with control used for age, is almost identical to that of the heads of household. The small proportion represented by this group and their similar occupational distribution suggest that their inclusion would not significantly alter the findings presented in this article. Excluding the households not eligible for the survey, the response rate is 63 percent. Although nonresponse rates usually are not reported in Chilean surveys, exchange with Chilean experts indicates that the nonresponse rate is about 20 to 25 percent for face-to-face household surveys. The higher nonresponse rate of the CMS is likely attributable to the difficulty contacting male heads of household. 4 The total sample size is 3,544. I exclude individuals outside the age range of 25 to 64 years, which is conventionally used in comparative mobility research and cases with unusable data. After this exclusion, the usable sample size is 3,002.
C CL LA AS SS S S SC CH HE EM MA A
This study uses a class perspective to describe the Chilean social structure. It utilizes the sevencategory version of the classification developed by the CASMIN project. This classification is widely used in international comparative research, and describes the basic stratification of advanced industrial societies based on "employment relationships" (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992a:35-47; Goldthorpe and Heath 1992) . The seven classes included in the schema are I+II (service class), III (routine nonmanual workers), IVab (self-employed workers), V+VI (manual supervisors and skilled manual workers), VIIa (unskilled manual workers), IVc (farmers), and VIIb (farm workers).
Use of the 7-class categorization instead of an alternative detailed 12-class version produced by the CASMIN project (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992b) Table 2 ). A collapsed sevenfold class schema was however preferred because of the moderate sample size of the Chilean survey, and because it grants international comparability of the findings. 5 Operationalization of this class classification is based on detailed information concerning job title (recoded into the standard ISCO-88 classification [ILO 1990 ]), industry, occupational status, and supervisory status of workers. Because the CMS is specifically designed to assess class mobility, it includes all the information necessary to produce the CASMIN class schema. The CASMIN project has not produced a standard algorithm to generate the class classification, but other researchers have produced such an algorithm, which I use in this analysis (Ganzeboom and Treiman 2003) . Table 1 presents the basic intergenerational mobility table to be used in this analysis, including the counts and marginal percentage distribution for origin and destination classes.
4 43 32 2----A AM ME ER RI IC CA AN N S SO OC CI IO OL LO OG GI IC CA AL L R RE EV VI IE EW W 4 The nonresponse rate can yield bias if those who were unreachable or refused to participate differ from those included in the sample. To estimate the magnitude of this bias, I compared the distribution of key variables with the CASEN 2000 survey. CASEN is a large survey (n = 252,595) conducted by the Chilean government, and has a refusal rate lower than 10 percent. The comparison (available upon request) suggests that the CMS slightly underrepresents agricultural workers and the upper class. Overall, however, there is no indication of major nonresponse bias.
5 Analyses were replicated using the detailed 12-class table, and no difference in substantive findings was found. M ME ET TH HO OD DS S I fit two alternative models to the Chilean mobility table. The first is the "core model of social fluidity," which claims to capture basic international similarity in mobility. Although the core model has become a benchmark for mobility research, and currently is the only model that provides a comparative framework for mobility analysis, analysts have drawn attention to a number of its limitations. The model has been criticized for inadequately representing hierarchical mobility effects, for being tailored to a few industrialized countries, for the ad hoc nature of some effects it includes (specifically the affinity effects), and for lacking a criterion to determine how much divergence is necessary for it to be rejected (Ganzeboom, Luijkx, and Treiman 1989; Hout and Hauser 1992; Sorensen 1992; Yamaguchi 1987) . I therefore also test an alternative "hybrid model" that combines the row-column (II) association model (Goodman 1979 ) with parameters accounting for class immobility. The international and temporal comparison of Chilean mobility patterns uses the uniform-difference (UNIDIFF) model, also known as the multiplicative layer effect model (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992a; Xie 1992) . Model comparison and selection is based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) statistic (Raftery 1995) . I start by fitting the core model to the Chilean mobility table. The core model represents the basic international commonality in social fluidity using a topological formulation. In contrast to standard topological models constructed from a single allocation of cells (Hauser 1978 ), the core model uses eight matrices, each of which is designed to capture a particular effect that enhances or reduces mobility between specific classes Goldthorpe 1987a, 1992a, chapter 4) . In this way, the model permits the sources of commonality across nations to be identified clearly, and likewise the departures from it. The effects are of four types: hierarchy, inheritance, sector, and affinity. 6 HIERARCHY EFFECTS. Hierarchy effects reflect the impact of status distances between classes on fluidity between them. To estimate these effects, the mobility table is divided into three strata, reflecting differences in resources and rewards across classes. The strata are the following: upper stratum (class I+II), middle stratum (classes III, IVab, IVc, and V-VI), and lower stratum (classes VIIa and VIIb). Because there are three strata, two hierarchy effects (HI1 and HI2) can be identified, each representing the crossing of one additional hierarchical barrier. The association between each pair of classes is expressed as an inverse function of the number of hierarchical strata crossed. AFFINITY EFFECTS. Affinity effects are intended to capture specific discontinuities (negative affinities) or linkages (positive affinities) between classes, which either reinforce or offset the overall effects of hierarchy and sector. There are two affinity effects. The first, AF1, identifies the difficulty of moving between the service class (I+II) and the class of farm workers (VIIb), which adds to their hierarchical distance. In contrast, AF2 identifies instances in which mobility is more frequent than accounted for by hierarchy and sector effects, and includes affinities within the nonmanual sector (I+II and III) and within the manual sector (V+VI and VIIa): a symmetrical affinity based on capital possession (IVab and IVc, and I and IVab) and an asymmetrical link between agricultural classes of origin (IVc and VIIb) and the unskilled manual class of destination (VIIa). 7 Table 3 ; CASMIN coefficients are reported in row 2; and differences in coefficients' magnitude and the statistical significance of the differences are reported in row 3. 8 All Chilean coefficients are significant and have the same sign as for the CASMIN countries. Comparison of the magnitude of the coefficients, however, shows significant departures from the core for five effects, which reveal interesting differences between Chile and the CASMIN countries. The hierarchy coefficients indicate that whereas the short-range hierarchical barriers are somewhat weaker in Chile
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8 CASMIN coefficients were obtained from fitting the core model to the combined table of France and England, standardizing both tables to have 10,000 cases, as recommended by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992a:121) . The coefficients obtained are virtually identical to those presented by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992a, Table 4.4) . Note: EHE = empirical hierarchical effects; SES = eocioeconomic status. a Linear-by-linear association model using socioeconomic status scores as presented in Appendix Figure A1 to rank origin and destination classes.
7 For a detailed account of the empirical derivation of the model, see Erikson and Goldthorpe (1987a , 1987b , and 1992a (HI1), long-range hierarchical mobility is more difficult in this country (HI2). This suggests substantial inequality between the extremes of the class hierarchy combined with smaller differentiation in the middle of the distribution. As to the inheritance effects, the service class, the self-employed group, and the farmers (classes I+II, IVab, and IVc, respectively) have a significantly lower propensity to immobility in Chile than in the CASMIN countries, suggesting that class positions usually associated with independent work are less able to reproduce their class status intergenerationally than depicted by the core. Most impressive, the barrier between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors of the economy (SE1) is much weaker in Chile, as is the affinity effect linking nonmanual classes, manual classes, and the classes that own capital among themselves (AF2).
Interestingly, all the significant differences in coefficients, with the single exception of the barrier to long-range hierarchical mobility, suggest that Chile is more fluid than the core model depicts. Higher fluidity seems to be driven by the weakness of horizontal barriers separating the agricultural, manual, and self-employed sectors of the economy. This is consistent with findings of weaker sector effects in countries that have experienced rapid industrialization, such as Korea (Park 2004) , Brazil (CostaRibeiro 2003), Israel (Yaish 2004; Goldthorpe et al. 1997) , and Japan (Ishida et al. 1991) .
Additionally, in the Chilean case, the weakness of sector barriers may have been intensified by the deep market transformation of the 1970s and 1980s. On the one hand, the "change of hands" in the agricultural sector induced by the agrarian reform and counterreform likely increased fluidity between the agricultural and urban classes. On the other hand, the role of selfemployment, as an ephemeral refuge against (industrial and public sector) unemployment may have reduced barriers between the selfemployed group and the rest of the social structure. Added to the larger difficulty of long-range hierarchical mobility, these features suggest weak sector cleavages in the Chilean fluidity pattern and high salience of the hierarchical dimension of mobility.
For the countries in which the fit of the core model is not adequate, Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992a:145) suggest adding parameters that account for country-specific deviations from the model. I therefore introduce adjustments to reflect salient characteristics of the Chilean fluidity pattern, producing a "Chilean version" of the core model. First, I modify the hierarchical effects. Fitting of the core model suggests that hierarchical barriers are a crucial determinant of mobility in Chile. This conclusion is, however, obscured by the fact that the hierarchical strata distinguished by the core model are not empirically obtained, and may not accurately represent the Chilean ranking of classes in terms of socioeconomic status (SES). To model hierarchical effects in Chile adequately, I rank classes using the unweighted average of their schooling and earning levels as a proxy for SES. I then collapse the seven classes into three hierarchical strata using cluster analysis. These three empirically obtained strata are the following: Upper stratum (service class: I+II), middle stratum (routine nonmanual and self-employed group: III and IVab), and lower stratum (manual and agricultural classes: V-VI, VIIa, IVc, and VIIb). Details on the ranking of classes, cluster procedures, and the comparison of the CASMIN and empirical Chilean class ranking can be found in the Appendix. Comparison of the CASMIN and the empirical class ranking suggests higher differentiation at the top than at the bottom of the social structure in the Chilean case.
Model 2 in Table 2 uses the empirically obtained hierarchical strata (EHE). The improvement in fit is massive (the difference in BIC is 29.3, without using any degrees of freedom). The model now accounts for 86 percent of the association under independence.
The large improvement in fit when empirical hierarchical strata are used challenges the assumption of an internationally homogeneous hierarchical class ranking. At the empirical level, there is no proof that the hierarchical ranking of classes assumed by the core model fits all CASMIN countries. 9 Moreover, some evidence points to significant cross-country dif-ferences in the ranking of classes (Hout and Hauser 1992; Sorensen 1992) . At the theoretical level, the creators of the core model highlight the relevance of highly specific, historically formed national attributes to explain international variation in mobility. These national particularities may very well result in different hierarchical positions of classes across countries. 10 Furthermore, even if the homogeneous ranking of classes imposed by the CASMIN researchers applied to most CASMIN countries, significant departures may be found in the late industrialized countries currently being added to the comparative mobility project. The Chilean findings suggest that instead of imposing international homogeneity to the hierarchical dimension of mobility, the ranking of classes should be treated as nationally specific parameters to be estimated, as mobility researchers routinely treat row and column marginals of the mobility table. The issue is important because the hierarchical dimension is the most relevant dimension of mobility (Hout and Hauser 1992; Wong 1992) , and inadequate modeling can bias assessment of not only hierarchical effects of mobility but also other effects.
Two other changes were introduced to account for Chilean-specific deviations from the core model. First, the IN2 effect was rearranged to exclude the self-employed class (IVab) and to include the class of farm workers (VIIb). This rearrangement accounts for the fact that the Chilean self-employed class appeared less likely than depicted by the core model to reproduce its class position across generations; and the inheritance level of Chilean farm workers is higher than in the CASMIN countries. These changes are expressed in the Chilean-specific inheritance parameter IN2-C. Second, an affinity parameter (AF1-C) was added to capture the difficulty of long-range downward elite mobility. This negative asymmetrical affinity links flows from the service class to the agricultural classes, and from the routine nonmanual class to the class of farm workers. Note that the AF1-C adds to the hierarchical distance between the two extremes of the class structure, and to the negative affinity captured by AF1 to depict the extreme difficulty of long-range downward mobility from the Chilean elite. The fit of this 'Chilean version' of the core model is reported in Table 2 , model 3. The improvement in BIC from model 2 is substantial. Furthermore, even if the model falls short in terms of standard statistical criteria, it accounts for a large 91% of the association under independence, thereby supporting the claim that it adequately represents the Chilean mobility pattern. The parameter estimates for the Chilean version of the core are reported in row 5, Table 3 .
Because of the core model's undesirable properties, I also use an alternative approach to examine Chilean mobility patterns. This approach uses the now standard association row-column (II) (RC [II] ) model (Goodman 1979 ; see also Hout 1983, and Wong 1992) . In this model, both origin and destination classes are scaled so that the association can be expressed as a linear-by-linear interaction by a single parameter. The multiplicative form of the model can be expressed as follows:
where i indexes class of origin, j indexes class of destination, F ij is the expected frequency in the (i,j) cell, is the grand mean, i O pertains to the class of origin marginal effect, j D pertains to the class of destination marginal effect, is a global association parameter, µ i is the scale value for the i th class of origin, and ν j is the scale score for the j th class of destination, subject to the following normalization constraints: Σµi = Σνj = 0 (normalization of the location) and Σµi 2 = Σνj 2 = 1 (normalization of the scale).
The class scale scores reflect a latent continuous variable made manifest by the class categories. Empirically obtained from the data, these "distance" scores produce an optimal ranking of classes for the purpose of mobility analysis. The RC(II) model is appropriate for modeling the association of any two ordinal variables, but mobility tables are distinctive because of the correspondence between class of origin and class of destination (Gerber and Hout 2004:691) .
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10 For instance, during the socialist period in Hungary, the status of the proletariat may have been indistinguishable from the status of the routine nonmanual class (Szelenyi 1998:62) . In Scotland, given to early industrialization, the hierarchical barrier between the skilled and unskilled working classes that characterizes other CASMIN countries may not exist (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992a:163 I introduce two adjustments to account for this correspondence, transforming the formulation into a "hybrid model." First, topological parameters will account for the large counts in some diagonal cells reflecting immobility (inheritance) effects. These parameters distinguish two inheritance levels: "high inheritance" for the service class (I+II), farmers (IVc), and farm workers (VIIb), and "low inheritance" for all other classes, with the exception of the routine nonmanual workers.
Model 4 in Table 2 reports the fit statistic for this quasi-RC(II) model. The BIC statistic rejects it and prefers the more parsimonious Chilean version of the core model. Therefore, I introduce a second adjustment to account for the correspondence between rows and columns in mobility tables. Origin and destination scores are constrained to be the same, assuming that the scaling of classes has not significantly changed over time. Model 5 in Table 2 reports fit statistics for this homogeneous quasi-RC(II) model. On the basis of the BIC statistic, the fit of the model is as good as that of the Chilean version of the core model (Wong [1994] shows that BIC differences of less than 5 points should be considered indeterminate). Thus, under standard statistical criteria, the Chilean core model and the homogeneous quasi-RC(II) model are indistinguishable. Given that the Chilean version of the core model was tailored to fit the Chilean table, the fit of model 5 is impressive, and it indicates that a unidimensional scale can adequately capture mobility distances between classes.
The logical next question is what this scale represents, and specifically whether it represents the hierarchical ranking of classes in terms of SES. If a close correspondence is found between the mobility distances among classes and their distances in terms of SES, this finding would suggest that the intragenerational distribution of resources and rewards expressed in the SES ranking of classes drives the process of intergenerational mobility. In other words, this finding would support the resource approach's claim that differences in resources associated with diverse class positions determine mobility opportunities across generations.
To examine this possibility, I compare the class scores obtained from the homogeneous quasi-RC(II) model with the empirically obtained SES ranking of classes based on education and earnings (Appendix). Figure 4 presents the comparison between the standardized values of both sets of scores. The correspondence is striking. The mobility distances between classes closely reproduce their distances in terms of SES. This close isomorphism suggests that, at least in Chile, the intragenerational inequality in the distribution of social resources and rewards across classes largely drives the intergenerational mobility process. To test the isomorphism further, I use the SES class scores as row and column rankings to estimate a quasi-linear-by-linear association model (model 6, Table 2 ). The fit of model 6 is significantly worse than that of model 5, almost as poor as that of the original core model. This indicates that although the inter-and intragenerational dimensions of inequality are very similar in Chile, they have a somewhat different structure.
In summary, the central characteristic of the Chilean mobility regime is the predominance of long-range hierarchical barriers and the weakness of sector cleavages separating classes in the middle and at the lower end of the hierarchical structure. Findings from the "Chilean version" of the core model and the quasi-RC(II) hybrid models are consistent, depicting a social structure characterized by signif icant barriers between the top echelon and the rest of the class structure. The good fit of the homogeneous quasi-RC(II) model provides preliminary support for the resource approach linking inequality and mobility. Mobility dynamics seem to be driven largely by the hierarchical distances between classes, and overall, Chile seems not to be less fluid than the CASMIN countries.
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Although Chilean mobility dynamics seem to be driven by inequality across classes in a very unequal society, the fitting of the core model provides no indication that Chile is significantly less fluid than depicted by the core model. As a preliminary analysis of the Chilean level of fluidity, I compare the predicted propensities for mobility and immobility between specific pairs of classes in Chile with those in the CASMIN countries. Propensities are obtained from the original and Chilean versions of the core model, respectively (models 2 and 5 of Table 3 ). I begin with the immobility of those at the top of the class structure, namely the service class (I+II). The service class' propensity for immobility in the original core model is captured by two parameters, IN1 and IN2. This propensity is more than three times what it would be in the absence of these effects (e .43+.84 = 3.56). In Chile, the propensity for immobility of class I+II is captured by the same two parameters, and it is lower than what the core model expresses: 2.86 times larger than it would be in the absence of these effects (e .34+.71 ). What about the immobility of the two agricultural classes? In the CASMIN countries, immobility of the IVc and VIIb classes is, respectively, 7.85 and 1.54 times what it would be in the absence of these parameters (e .43+.84+1.01-.22 and e .43 , respectively). In Chile, the comparable values are 4.22 and 2.86 (e .34+.71+.48-.09 and e .43+.71 , respectively), indicating the relatively low inheritance associated with land ownership in the Latin American nation. Thus, if attention is focused on the immobility in the upper and lower ends of the social hierarchy, the comparison does not indicate less fluidity in the highly unequal Chilean society.
What about the mobility rates between the two most distant classes in the hierarchical ranking, namely, the service class (I+II) and farm workers (VIIb)? In the case of the CASMIN countries, the mobility chances between these classes are captured by four parameters (HI1, HI2, SE1, and AF1), and is .077 times smaller than it would be in the absence of these effects (e -.22 -.45-1.06-.83 ). In Chile, the distance from class I to class VIIb is expressed by these same four parameters in addition to the asymmetrical disaffinity AF1-C. This yields mobility chances .056 times what would be obtained in the absence of these effects (e -.09 -.47-.20-.63-.1.49 ). Thus, the barrier to long-range downward mobility from the elite is more significant in Chile than in the CASMIN countries. The same occurs with long-range downward mobility from class III.
If we measure the reciprocal flow (i.e., upward mobility from class VIIb to class I+II), we obtain the same value for the CASMIN countries, because all parameters are symmetrical in the original core model. For Chile, however, this calculation removes the asymmetrical barrier to elite downward mobility, which rais- es the chances of mobility to .25 of what it would be in the absence of these effects (e -.09 -.47-.20-.63 ). Surprisingly for a society with such a high level of inequality, the barrier to long-range upward mobility is significantly less than in the CASMIN countries.
What about the relative chances of moving between classes that are closer in terms of status? The Chilean version of the core model suggests that the pattern should be as fluid in Chile, if not more so, because of the weak sector effects. For example, in CASMIN countries, the propensity to move from the farmer class (IVc) to the unskilled manual class (VIIa) is .44 times what it would be in the absence of these effects (e -.22-1.06+.45 ). In contrast, in Chile there is higher fluidity, with mobility 1.28 times what neutral mobility would be (e -.20+.45 ). Again, there is no indication of more rigidity in the Chilean fluidity pattern.
Finally, I compare the mobility flows between the voluminous skilled and unskilled working classes. Whereas in Chile there is no effect modifying the fluidity between classes V-VI and VIIa, in the CASMIN countries, they are separated by a hierarchical effect, but connected by an affinity effect. This marginally increases fluidity to 1.08 of what it would be in the absence of this effect (e -.26+.34 ), indicating no significant international differences.
These case-by-case comparisons suggest that although hierarchical effects, especially those associated with long-range downward mobility from the elite, are stronger in Chile, sector barriers are weaker, yielding a pattern that is as fluid, if not more so, than that in advanced industrial nations.
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To explore further the level of fluidity in Chile in an international context, I compare the strength of the origin-destination association between Chile and seven industrialized countries: England, France, Sweden, Ireland, Scotland, the United States, and Israel. The rationale for including these countries is as follows. England and France are the central countries from which the core model was derived (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1987a , 1987b , 1992a ; Sweden and the United States are among the most fluid countries in the CASMIN pool; Scotland and Ireland are found to be among the most rigid nations within the CASMIN set (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992a, chapter 11) ; and Israel is the most fluid society in which empirical studies have been conducted, significantly more fluid than any of the CASMIN countries (Goldthorpe et al. 1997; Yaish 2000) . 11 In order to assess cross-national variation in social fluidity, I fit a set of models for the threeway table of class of origin, class of destination and country (Table 4) . The model of conditional independence, assuming no association between origins and destinations across countries given different national margins (Table 4 , column 1), is presented as a baseline against which other models may be assessed. As expected, the fit is very poor, indicating significant origin-destination association in the countries analyzed.
The second model tested is that of "common fluidity," which postulates that the strength of the origin-destination association is the same across countries. 12 As column 2 of Table 4 shows, the model significantly improves the fit, when compared with conditional independence (L 2 = 987.2 df = 252 BIC = -1767.8).
Although the model does not fit the data well under standard statistical criteria, it accounts for a large 96 percent of the association under independence.
I then turn to the question of international variation. To test the hypothesis that the strength of the origin-destination association varies across countries, I use a model independently developed by Xie (1992) and Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992a) , and known as the multiplicative layer effect, or uniform difference (UNIDIFF). The multiplicative formulation of the model is the following:
4 44 40 0----A AM ME ER RI IC CA AN N S SO OC CI IO OL LO OG GI IC CA AL L R RE EV VI IE EW W 11 Data on England, France, Sweden, the United States, Ireland, and Scotland were obtained from the CASMIN dataset. Data on Israel were obtained from the 1991 Israeli Social Mobility Survey. Samples are reduced to men ages 25 to 64 years in the CAS-MIN countries, and to Jewish men ages 25 to 64 years in Israel. 12 Note that this is not the core model of fluidity estimated in the previous section, but a full interaction model, which uses one parameter for each cell of the 
where i indexes class of origin, j indexes class of destination, k indexes country, F ijk is the expected frequency in the (i,j,k) cell, the parameters are subject to the ANOVA-type normalization constraint that they multiply to 1 along all appropriate dimensions, n represents the grand mean, i O pertains to the class of origin marginal effect, j D pertains to the class of destination marginal effect, k C pertains to the country marginal effect, ij describes the origin-destination association over all countries, and the k s describe the country-specific deviation from the overall association. The extent of association in country k is now the product of two components: the origin-destination association common to all countries and the national deviation parameter k . 13 As indicated by column 3 of Table 4 , the fit of the model is significantly improved when the strength of association is allowed to vary across countries. The k s indicate country-specific departures from the overall level of association. 14 The larger the country-specif ic deviation k parameter, the stronger the origin-destination association in country k, i.e., the less fluid the country is. Comparison of the parameters yields a striking conclusion: Chile is more fluid than any of the advanced European countries, and has a level of fluidity in between the highly fluid United States and Israeli societies. Finding high fluidity in a developing country is not completely novel. In fact, Park (2004) demonstrated that Korea is more fluid than France, England, and even Sweden. However, economic inequality in Korea is comparable with that in advanced industrial nations (Deininger and Squire 1996) . What contradicts a resource approach-based expectation is to find high fluidity in a country with one of the highest levels of inequality in the world. 15 
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To explore further the association between mobility and inequality, I examine the change in mobility rates over time in Chile. Specifically, I test whether fluidity has changed across three periods: the redistributive period (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) , the market transformation period (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) , and the growth and democratization period Note: = country-specific deviation from overall origin-destination association (see text for details).
13 Alternatively, I could have used the log-additive layer model (Yamaguchi 1987) . The problem with this model is its requirement that the origin and destination categories be correctly ordered (in terms of mobility distances), which produces a different result for each combination of origin and destination ordering (Goodman and Hout 1998; Xie 1992) .
14 Following Xie's (1992) formulation, the scale of the k parameters is normalized so that Σ k 2 equals 1.
15 Note that I cannot say anything about the sources of fluidity in a particular country by using this method. Instead of a summary test such as the one used here, this would require a local test in which specific sets of cells are modeled (Wong 1990 ).
Delivered by Ingenta to Columbia University (cid 66000309) IP : 127.0.0.1 12:04:11 (1989 . Given the significant increase in inequality during the market reform (as Figure  3 indicates, the period-average Gini index grew from .49 to .55), an association between inequality and fluidity should express itself as a significant change in mobility rates during that period.
The advantage of a trend analysis is that by focusing on a single country, it controls for unobserved factors producing international variation. However, because the data come from a single, cross-sectional study, I divide the sample into three successive birth cohorts and interpret intercohort change as period effects. The first cohort (born between 1937 and 1943) reached occupational maturity-defined in this analysis as 30 years old-between 1967 and 1973, during the redistributive period. The second cohort (born between 1944 and 1958) reached occupational maturity during the market transformation period (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) . The third cohort (born between 1959 and 1970) reached occupational maturity during the period of sustained economic growth and democratization (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) . As is well known, a limitation of cohort analysis is the inability to distinguish between life cycle (age), period, and cohort interpretations of change (Ryder 1965) . 16 The potentially confounding effects of life cycle differences are minimized by including only individuals who have reached occupational maturity, under the assumption that there is little career mobility after that point (Goldthorpe 1980; Heath and Payne 1999) . 17 However, the analysis cannot distinguish between cohort and period interpretations of change. To assess changes over time, I use the UNIDIFF model introduced in the previous section.
Panel A in Table 5 presents the parameter estimates for the model of conditional independence (model 1), the "constant social fluidity" model (model 2), and the UNIDIFF model (model 3). The conditional independence model assumes no origin-destination association and, as expected, fits the data poorly. The key model comparison is between the constant fluidity model, assuming no variation across historical periods, and the UNIDIFF model, which postulates a significant change in the level of fluidity over time. A comparison of models 3 and 2 indicates that allowing the origin-destination association to vary across cohorts does not lead to a significant improvement of fit over that of the constant fluidity model. The model comparison, therefore, indicates that mobility did not decline as a result of the growth in economic inequality during the market transformation, nor is there any change associated with the slight reduction of inequality and significant economic growth during the growth and redemocratization period.
To provide a more robust assessment of trends, a replicate analysis is presented in panel B, which replaces current class position with class position in first job as class destination. Because first job identifies the same life cycle stage for all respondents, this formulation presents an alternative way of controlling for the confounding of age and period. Findings are insensitive to the specification of class of destination. As panel B shows, the model allowing for change in fluidity across cohorts (model 3) fits the data significantly worse than the model assuming constant fluidity over time (model 2).
In summary, the cohort analysis shows no significant change in mobility rates over time despite a growth in inequality during the market reform. This finding suggests no association between mobility and inequality. An alternative explanation can be offered, however. I have shown that economic inequality significantly increased during the market transformation (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) . At the same time, some components of the market reform may have weakened the traditional barriers across sectors of the economy. The agrarian counterreform and consequent marketization of the countryside likely reduced the barriers separating agricultural classes, and the growth and diversification of the self-employed sector likely weakened the barriers separating the self-employed classes from the rest of the Chilean class structure. These processes may have induced two types of mobility change going in opposite directions. On the one hand, an increase in economic inequality would have heightened hierarchical barriers to mobil-4 44 42 2----A AM ME ER RI IC CA AN N S SO OC CI IO OL LO OG GI IC CA AL L R RE EV VI IE EW W 16 It also is important to note that as a cohort grows older, it suffers attrition by some members. Thus, the groups analyzed here are not true cohorts, but their current survivors (Goldthorpe 1980) . 17 Studies in industrialized countries usually define occupational maturity as the age of 35 years. For this study, 30 years of age was chosen for the Chilean case because of the earlier entry to work that characterizes developing nations. ity. On the other hand, marketization of the countryside and transformation of the self-employed sector would have weakened sector barriers to mobility, thereby inducing horizontal fluidity. Because these two effects counteract each other, the aggregate result may have led to no change in the total level of fluidity. Granted, this interpretation is speculative at the moment, but its derivation from historical evidence and its consistency with observed trends make it a plausible account of mobility trends in Chile. This article uses an international comparative strategy to analyze the Chilean mobility regime, and exploits the particularities of the Chilean case to contribute to the international comparative study of mobility. The findings indicate that the Chilean mobility dynamics are defined by strong hierarchical effects combined with weak horizontal barriers separating sectors of the economy. In fact, a single unidimensional scale effectively captures the Chilean mobility opportunities, and this scale closely reflects the vertical distances between classes in terms of earnings and education. In other words, the intergenerational mobility chances to a large extent mirror the contemporaneous distribution of rewards and resources across Chilean classes. This finding is fully consistent with the resource approach, which maintains that mobility opportunities are largely driven by differential access to resources across classes. International and temporal comparative analyses seem to contradict, however, the association between inequality and mobility posed by the resource perspective. Comparison with seven industrialized countries shows that Chile is highly fluid, as fluid as the most open nations in the world despite its great inequality. Furthermore, the analysis of Chilean mobility trends shows constant mobility rates over time despite the significant increase in inequality during the market transformation period.
These findings depict Chile as an exceptional case, in which high inequality does not seem to depress mobility opportunities. However, if we consider the pattern of inequality and not only Note: = Country-specific deviation from overall origin-destination association (see text for details) 18 An empirical strategy to test this hypothesis would be to evaluate the change over time in magnitude of the different mobility effects of the Chilean version of the core model. Unfortunately, given the relatively small number of cases in the cohort-specific tables, coefficients representing temporal change are mostly statistically insignificant, thus not allowing a conclusive test. its aggregate level, the Chilean exceptionalism disappears. A focus on the pattern of inequality shows that Chile is unequal because the elite concentrates a large proportion of the national income. High concentration at the top decile is, however, accompanied by much lower inequality-lower in fact than in the United Statesacross the rest of the social structure. The pattern of mobility closely follows the type of inequality that characterizes Chile. High hierarchical barriers to mobility, especially between the top stratum and the rest of the class structure, are combined with weak horizontal barriers between classes that are close in terms of SES. In other words, the Chilean case can be seen as the combination of two distinct regimes of both inequality and mobility. Income concentration at the top leads to strong mobility barriers between the top echelon and the rest of the class structure, and a more even income distribution between nonelite classes leads to significant fluidity among them. Distinction of these two components of the Chilean structure suggests that inequality and mobility are in fact related, but that their relationship is captured only when the specific features of these distributive phenomena are considered.
The focus on the pattern of inequality and mobility also provides a plausible explanation for the lack of change in Chilean mobility after the market-oriented transformation. Fluidity did not decline during the market reform because in concert with growing economic inequality, the liberalization of the economy led to a decline in nonhierarchical sector barriers to mobility. Thus, the lack of temporal trend may reflect the additive effect of two processes: growing hierarchical barriers between the top stratum and the rest of the class structure on the one hand and a decline in sector barriers to mobility across classes at the lower end of the class structure on the other hand. The lack of temporal mobility trend challenges Friedman's (1962:171) implication that "competitive, free enterprise capitalism" leads to growing mobility and suggests that even if some sector barriers may have declined, the market reform did not yield growing opportunities for advancement for the Chilean population.
This analysis has multiple implications for the comparative study of mobility. The most immediate conclusion is that the link between inequality and mobility should be explored in terms of the pattern exhibited by these distributive phenomena, and that it may be completely obscured if, as done in previous studies, only their aggregate level is considered.
The Chilean analysis also suggests that understanding the sources of international variation in mobility would benefit from two developments. First, the inclusion of countries beyond the industrialized core would add significant variation in terms of class structures and institutional arrangements affecting national mobility patterns. Second, understanding of the link between mobility and other national attributes would benefit from a combination of careful comparison of specific class barriers across countries, with a weighting of these barriers according to the hierarchical distance between the classes they separate. If we care about mobility, it is because it is not the same to be an unskilled manual worker as it is to belong to the service class in terms of access to the scarce resources and rewards that determine life chances. If it was the same, if there were not hierarchical but only sector differences between these two classes, then the issue of mobility would not be a question of equality of opportunity, but, at most, of diverse preferences or functional differentiation.
Therefore, it is important to distinguish between consequential and inconsequential mobility barriers. If a barrier is located between two classes that have a similar position in the SES hierarchy, then this barrier is less consequential in terms of equality of economic opportunity, in the sense that movers will not see their life chances signif icantly altered. Accordingly, this barrier should be assigned a lower weight in the analysis. In contrast, if the barrier is located between two classes that are distant in the social hierarchy, mobility among them will be highly consequential, because it will imply a significant change in the life chances of the movers. Accordingly, this barrier should be assigned a much higher weight. Chile is a paradigmatic example of high incidence of inconsequential mobility, but rare instances of consequential mobility.
At the theoretical level, the Chilean analysis underscores the limitations of theories that link inequality and mobility by focusing only on micro-level mechanisms, such as individual resources or incentives. The Chilean findings suggest that these theories should be preceded by a macro-level understanding of the topography of inequality and mobility within the country to determine the precise distance across classes in terms of the resources enjoyed by each, and consequently, the differential incentives involved in the competition for success. Shifting the focus from the level to the pattern of mobility and inequality also can illuminate other national cases. For instance, the case of the U.S. has puzzled researchers because of its high level of fluidity despite its status as the most unequal country in the industrialized world (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992a:381) . Attempting to explain this f inding, some researchers have argued for the incentive approach, claiming that inequality promotes individual attempts to "get ahead," thus leading to enhanced fluidity. An alternative interpretation, however, would take into account the pattern of American inequality and mobility. Despite all the recent concern about "the rich getting richer" (Mishel et al. 2005; Wolff 1995) , the U.S. pattern of inequality is exactly opposite that of Chile. The United States is unequal because the poor receive an extremely small portion of the national income (Alesina and Glaeser 2004:47; Atkinson 1996, Table 2 ; Smeeding and Rainwater 2002) . Consistently, examination of mobility patterns in the United States reflects significant barriers to upward mobility for the lower class, and more fluidity in the rest of the table, which might result in an overall high level of fluidity (see Gottschalk and Danziger 1998, Tables 2 and 3 , for evidence based on long-term income mobility, and Featherman and Hauser 1978, Table 4 .12, for an early analysis of class mobility).
Combining a careful analysis of class rankings-to evaluate the consequence of different barriers to mobility-with a detailed examination of specific barriers between classes will permit researchers to take a new step in comparative analysis that addresses the systematic association between national economic and institutional characteristics of different countries and the opportunities of their citizen to alter their life chances. The variables used in the analysis are education (year of schooling) and earnings (Chilean pesos/ month). Figure A1 plots the mean standardized value of schooling and earnings across classes. Hierarchical strata presented in Table A1 were obtained from cluster analysis of mean schooling and earnings across classes. 19 
